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OLD WINE IN NEW SKINS:
A COMMENT ON WARNERl
Lynn D. Johnson, * Ph.D.
I have often though t that in psychotherapy we tend to
rediscover the wheel each generation. We never tire of
declaring how far we have come. Considering
Santayna's dour prediction about the fate of those who
ignore the past, it is useful for us to examine new
developments in our field with an eye to history.
Warner (1982) conveys in his article this sense of
discovery. Such a sense is exciting and, to the
experienced psychotherapist, familiar. Warner
postulates that he and his associates have developed a
remarkable new approach to mental health which is
based on eternal principles applied to everyday life. This
application, they suggest, leads to a qualitatively
different and better way of experiencing one's self and
the world.
Warner suggests persons experience emotions and
feelings as things which occur spontaneously (at least
those experienced subjectively as "genuine" and not
contrived or exaggerated), over which they have no
control. Therefore, changes in strong, deeply felt
emotions are experienced as miraculous--perhaps due to
divine intervention. People experience themselves as
receiving, not initiating, emotions.
Warner then postulates that feelings are actually selfserving and determined more by the advantage they
offer as a defense than by circumstances. He postulates
that long-term, deeply held, unpleasant feelings
experienced as "happening to" the person are a lie. The
person actually has an active part in creating those
feelings through choosing to perceive and construct
reality in certain ways. A person is motivated to create
this distortion because it helps shield him from the fact
that he has been untrue to his own self, his own sense of
right and wrong. Warner terms this process "selfbetrayaL" Negative feelings, in summary, are caused by
perceptual distortions rooted in our desire to justify
ourselves for not doing what we ought.
Warner then outlines a "standard theory and
treatment" which he claims represents "mainstream
psychology." This he describes as the therapist
encouraging the acceptance of deeply held feelings, the
congruent expression of those feelings, and the search
for means of legitimately achieving the needs and wants
expressed in those feelings. Warner suggests that
"mainstream psychology" (more accurately,
psychotherapy) fails to be helpful by failure to attend to
the self-serving, self-justifying, defensive functions of
emotions.
I

Obviously, what Warner has done is to take the
contemporary Church doctrines about repentance and
apply them to psychotherapy. The process of
acknowledging the error of one's behavior, the
acceptance of responsibility, and the subsequent change
of heart are clearly rooted in a model of the gospel. As
LOS counselors read Warner's theory and application,
then, they will be impressed with these efforts.
In this article, I intend to question whether the gospel
can be applied to mental health issues across the board. I
do accept the concept that many people who are unhappy
might well benefit greatly from Warner's concepts.
However, I intend to question whether those people are
suffering from mental disorders in the sense of
qualifying for a OSM III diagnosis.
I also intend to demonstrate that Warner's portrayal
of "standard theory and treatment" is a straw man, set
up for the purpose of being knocked down. Warner's
idea that therapists are promoting acceptance of feelings
rather than change of feelings is naive from a theoretical
point of view. Many therapy systems do in fact promote
actual changes in feelings and behavior, not merely
acceptance and negotiation. While it may be true that
many counselors practice what Warner has described,
this is not an indictment of theory but of the
practitioners.
As to the straw man point: Cognitive therapy (Beck,
et. al.. 1979) is probably the most effective
psychotherapeutic approach for depression which has
been evaluated carefully. In therapy outcome trials,
psychotherapy typically falls far behind psychotropic
medications in effect. The Beck studies, reviewed in the
volume cited above, suggest cognitive therapy has as
much or more effect as medication (imipramine) and
lower relapse rates. In the cognitive therapy model.
feelings are viewed as outcomes of information
processing, usually auditory. In other words, what I say
to myself will determine my feelings, or more
accurately, what I believe about myself and the world
will determine my feelings. For example, if I believe I am
bad and have no value as a person, I will naturally feel
depressed. Beck and his associates postulate all feelings
are understandable and reasonable, given the
underlying assumptions and beliefs the person has
abou t the world. However, these beliefs and
assumptions are faulty, over-generalized, and not
empirically tested. The standard technique in this
system is to challenge feeling states through testing of
underlying beliefs. The feelings are not "lies," but they
are mistaken.
Strategic therapy is a system of therapy which is
rapidly growing in popularity (Smith, 1982). Milton H.
Erickson, M.D. is considered the dean of strategic
therapists. He was the father of the concept of strategic
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power to make the changes in the neurotic character of
the patient. If, however, the patient can\find out what
the therapist values and desires, the patient will begin to
involuntarily manipulate the therapist as he
manipulates everyone else around him.
Langs (1978) argues as a psychoanalyst that whenever
the therapist accepts as genuin. the feelings or
perceptions of the patient, he excuses the therapeutic
efforts of the analyst and patient. In other words, there
is no need to analyze that material since it is genuine.
Langs argues that this constitutes an unholy alliance, so
to speak, in which the patient's defenses are reinforced
rather than worked through. Langs argues that when
this happens, the patient, while consciously grateful, will
unconsciously perceive the therapist as corrupt or
incompetent, probably both. Langs postulates the proof
of such unconscious perceptions will be always present
in the verbal material the patient produces in therapy, in
derivitive (disguised and indirect) forms, and will form a
continuous thread to meaning through the therapeutic
relationship.
While the above weaken Warner's bold assertion ("No
one in mainstream psychology believes a feeling can be
genuine, i.e., really felt, and at the same time dishonest,
i.e., a lie about its own character." p. 25), the most
powerful example of the error of this position is taken
from Transactional Analysis (TA). TA is certainly a
popular approach to psychotherapy, at least from the
point of view of the self-help books sold. Every wellstocked paperbook bookstore will feature several T A
books in its "psychology" section.
A standard work in T A is Berne's 1966 volume,
PrincipltS of Group T rtalmenl. Berne says, "Self indulgence
in feelings of guilt, inadequacy, hurt, fear, and
resentment are colloquially called "rackets." ...The
problem of legitimacy in connection with such feelings
has not been completely solved by the transactional
analyst...(but) the transactional analyst starts from the
basic position that there is no such thing as Adult anger,
that anger is a "racket" indulged in with Parental
permission or encouragement... .To the Adult, pain and
frustration are problems to be solved; to the Child they
are provocations to be taken advantage of. ('Now I'm
entitled to hit you: he says) ...The same applies to
disappointment..." (pages 308-9) Berne was often
scornful of therapists who advocated free expression of
negative feelings, and would ask how throwing a
typewriter out the window would improve your
relationship with your boss.
It should be clear now that many therapists expect to
change feelings in their patients. Acceptance of feelings
may be present, but often as an intermediate step, with
the goal of change in the mind to the therapist. Further,
the strategic, Beierian, and T A therapists view
repetitive, strongly held negative feelings as strategies
of methods used by the patient to influence others. This,
according to these thinkers, is especially effective, since
the patient can disclaim responsibility for the feeling
while using it to his advantage, ("I just can't help being so
difficult when I'm depressed.")
While the reader at this point may appreciate that

therapy, and originated many of the concepts and
techniques (Haley, 1973). Erickson wa,~ famous for
appearing to totally accept the beliefs and feelings of his
patients, only to cause profound changes to happen to
those beliefs and feelings through the therapy process.
In Smith's 1982 survey, Haley and Erickson figured
among the top ten psychotherapists in terms of
influence on the thinking of clinical psychologists, so we
may assume this approach represents to some extent a
"standard therapy." Haley, Erickson's main proponent,
has consistently pointed out the interpersonal aspect of
communication (Haley, 1963). Feelings, for example, are
very powerful ways of communicating, and Haley has
recommended therapists view feelings as attempts to
communicate and influence others. The idea that feelings
should be expressed in therapy is discouraged in Haley's
work. He emphasizes the need for the therapist to have
clear, understandable goals for the patient, and to give
directives which accomplish those goals. Haley's
directives may be compliance-based, meaning that the
patient should do them in order to benefit; or resistancebased, meaning that only through resisting the directive
will the patient benefit. More commonly, Haley
advocates the double-bind--in which, no matter what
the patient does, he will benefit.
The interesting thing about the strategic therapy is
the the "cures" tend to be dramatic and almost
unbelievable. Haley (1973) describes Erickson's
therapeutic strategies and results; Palazzoli, 1978;
Palazzoli, et. al. 1978 describe the application of strategic
psychotherapy to two extremely difficult populations,
anorexia nervosa and schizophrenia, with similar
dramatic results. Weeks and L'Abate (1982) describe
paradoxical interventions and follow a case throughout
a complete course of therapy. Fisch, Weakland, and Segal
(1982) outline treatment within the Palo Alto brief
therapy model of six sessions or less, and demonstrate
impressive results. Haley (1980) details his work with
heroin addicts and early-onset schizophrenics, and even
gives a case-by-case outcome, a truly astonishing and
moving work.
A third example of therapy which is certainly
"mainstream" among graduates of the University of
Utah psychology program is Ernst G. Beier's
communications-analytic therapy. Beier's books (1966,
1975) detail his theory of behavior which claims that socalled involuntary behavior, such as symptoms and
emotions, are actually in service of the strategic
advantage those involuntary behaviors give, especially
in interpersonal relations. Beier argues that the child
learns very early that emotions of a certain class have
great power in his particular environment, and these
emotions will then be displayed whenever the child
needs the unique advantage they confer. The emotions
are subjectively felt as genuine. To the impartial
observer, however, they seem to be useful ways of
manipulating the self and others. This concept is close to
Warner's idea of the emotion as a "lie" although Beier
would repudiate the use of such a word as "lie" or "sin" as
unnecessary and judgmental. Beier believes the
nonjudgmental stance the therapist takes gives him the
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least question whether mental and spiritual health
might be orthogonal.

Warner is misinformed about his concept of "standard
theory and treatment", he might ask, "But hasn't
Warner described a powerful approach to mental health,
one which incorporates the gospel ideals of repentance
of sins and a change of heart? And what about the idea
that mental health services can be delivered to neurotic
populations through the use of group seminars,
conveying these ideas through examples and parables?"
The first point implies that bad feelings are sins. Some
would argue that feelings are resources God gives us to
help ourselves experience free agency. I have some
reservation with such a view, as it ignores the points
alluded to earlier--namely that feelings can be used
manipulatively: I rather want to raise the question
whether mental and spiritual health are the same. To
believe they are the same implies all mentally healthy
persons are living righteous lives. Some may not take
that view, but would take the view that all spiritually
healthy persons are mentally healthy.
I am not aware of any data which suggest all spiritually
healthy persons are mentally healthy. How would we
decide such a thing? I have seen persons in treatment for
psychosomatic disorders who seem to be righteous. In
the treatment of psychosomatic disorders, the problem
is not the existence of unpleasant feelings; on the
contrary, the problem is more often the absence of
unpleasant feelings. Psychosomatic patients seem to
lack the cognitive and conceptual tools necessary to
experience unpleasant feelings. The term "alexithymia"
has been coined to describe these patients, meaning "no
words for feelings." The patient has no idea there is a
problem, although through counseling they can become
aware of the underlying problems and address them.
The process of helping a patient arrive at that point,
however, is pure psychotherapy. I would guess that no
amount of seminars could be helpful to that population,
since it is through the interactive therapy process that
the patient "gets in touch with" the feelings, to use a
cliche. (We will not address the question of paradoxical
or family therapy approaches to this disorder.)
Can it be possible to imagine a person living a life
pleasing to God and not being mentally healthy? This
seems unknowable, since we can't make accurate
judgements for one of the dimensions. Nevertheless, let
us construct an hypothetical 2 x 3 table.
Since we cannot know how to classify persons along
the dimension of whether God is pleased with their lives,
let us instead substitute the judgment of such criteria as
"active in Church affairs" and "appears to live a
Christian life."
As you can see from Table 1, my examples are
somewhat simplistic. Nevertheless, I am sure we can
think of people who fit into each of the six classifications.
As workers in mental health, we tend to judge people
along the dimension at the top of the table. God, on the
other hand, being higher in his understandings and
perceptions than we are, judges along the dimensions at
the left of the table, or in eternal terms. Clearly the only
dimension we can actually judge is high versus low
mental health; the elaboration into a table of levels of
righteousness is conjecture. Nevertheless, we can at

TABLE 1

Saints
Ministering

Angels

High Mental Health

Low Mental Health

Well-adjusted saints;
active, faithful

Active, faithful saints
with psychosomatic
disorders, depressions,

Christians. etc.

etc.

Not Valiant
"Good" Men

Inactive "saints" who

Inactive "saints" with

ace happy, successful

neuroses. drinking problems

in the world, etc.

mild impulse disorders, etc.

Wicked,

Well-adjusted persons

Liars

who fight against

Psychopaths. severe impulse
disorders. suicides. etc.

God, Church; abortionists.
etc., who are
apparently happy

What about the second point, that teaching through
example and metaphor is a more effective way of
delivering mental health service? I believe this idea has
much to commend it, not the least of which is the
observation that Jesus did much of his teaching through
parable. Actually, the telling of stories is one of the
oldest ploys to bring about change, with roots in the Old
and New Testaments. Zen Buddhists and Hassidic Jews
are famous for their teaching through story. More
currently, Milton Erickson was well-known for his use
of stories and anecdotes, and his use of them has been
analyzed from several perspectives. Haley (1973) used
them to illustrate Erickson's systems orientation to
therapy, Bandler and Grinder (1975) looked at linguistic
patterns, Gordon (1978) extended linguistic and
matching operations analysis of metaphorical therapy,
Zeig (1980) illustrated the interpersonal outcomes of
Erickson's metaphors, and Rosen (1982) catalogued the
embedded messages in the metaphors into themes.
Bandler and Grinder point out that the process of
listening to a story creates an involuntary
"transderivational search," or in other words, a process
of applying the story to the self. Haley (1982) tells
humorously of this process.
"When some of my trainees visited Phoenix and met with
Erickson as a group, ... (he told them stories). When they
returned, one of them mentioned a story Erickson had told
about him. One of the others said, no, the story was actually
about her; ... (a)nother of them said the story applied to his
particular experience. It turned out that all of the group thought
they had received a personal metaphor from Erickson designed
just for them .... Yet ... the metaphors were stories and cases that
Erickson had told many times before....Some of the stories were
ones I had heard many years before and I knew they applied
personally to me." (p. 6)

Warner and his associates tell seminar participants
they are not being asked to identify with the stories. I
believe this to be an excellent way of achieving a more
profound identification with the story; so did Erickson.
He would never admit a story was aimed at anyone in
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becomes a noxious counselor.
We are unable to evaluate the presentl,techniques. It is
irresponsible and lazy of us to believe in a method which
offers only testimonials. Such proof is the mark of the
quack, and in medicine we would properly shy away
from it. How can we accept it in psychotherapy? Warner
has apparently done no follow-up to his seminars, or at
least he hasn't reported any. We do not know whether
5% or 95% of the people attending his seminars
experience significant personal gain. We do not know
whether 5% of those who do gain maintain that gain once
home. A useful contrast is found in Watzlawick,
Weakland, and Fisch (1974) where they report the
percent of persons who resolved the presenting
complaint after six sessions of strategic therapy. They
also discuss their failures and possible reasons for them.
Similarly, I have referred to Haley (1980) where he
published a case-by-case follow-up of his therapy with
young schizophrenics and young heroin addicts.
A second problem is in the lack of impartial
observation of the seminars. Argyris (1978), in his work
with organizations, has come to the hypothesis that
people cannot adequately verbally model their own
behavior. Argyris has observed a striking difference
between how people describe their behavior and what
they actually do. The first he calls the espoused theory and
the second the theory of action. Argyris argues we are
always blind to our own theory of action; thus we profit
from feedback from others. Similarly, a talented
psychotherapist can gain much from others observing
his work.
A third problem lies in the choice of population to
serve. Persons who seek help from seminars may be very
different from people who seek help from psychologists
or psychiatrists. Personally, I am sure they are, since I
have conducted numerous marriage communication
skills seminars. I find the people who attend these
seminars are much less disturbed than couples I see in
my practice. I find that with the former group it is easy to
significantly help them, while with the clinical group
much more energy is needed. If the people who attend
Warner's seminars are good, cooperative, bright people,
it may be quite easy to achieve significant gains.
A fQurth problem is with diagnosis. Warner claims his
approach is useful for the neuroses, but as pointed out
above, we do not know that his population would satisfy
diagnostic criteria for neuroses. If neurotics benefit,
which type of neurotic in particular? A bright
obsessional might accept this model, a depressive might
be worsened, and an hysteric might not understand a
word of it. The model may fit the person who blames
others for his feelings; what about the person who
blames himself?
A fifth problem is parsimony. William of Occam, I
believe, forbade the unnecessary multiplication of
entities. This article has suggested that remarkable
success in changing behavior and feelings is available
from other therapeutic interventions. Many of these
models do not accept the concept of the defensive and/or
intrapsychic role of feelings. Palazzoli (1978) detailed
her unsuccessful work with anorexics in which she used

particular. Once a friend of mine asked· him, "Those
stories you told us were really about us, ,Weren't they?"
He replied evasively that stories provided the
unconscious an opportunity to learn on many levels at
once, and his stories were merely therapy stories, with
no particular intention.
Another method used by Warner and his associates is
the technique of reframing, defined by the Palo Alto
group as "to change the conceptual and/or emotional
setting or viewpoint in relation to which the situation is
experienced, and to place it in another frame which fits
the 'fact' of the concrete situation equally well or better,
and thereby change the entire meaning." (Watzlawick,
Weakland, and Fisch, 1974, p. 95). Reframing is the
technique behind convincing the person complaining
about a half-empty glass that it is actually half full. In
more sophisticated forms, it is one of the therapist's
more potent tools. I recalL for example, a story Ernst
Beier once told about a woman who seemed clinically
paranoid. She claimed her co-workers were watching
her all the time. Rather than debate, the therapist
agreed, and convinced the woman it was because she did
a much better job than anyone else, and they were trying
to learn from her how they could do better. Her
symptoms then began to resolve.
Warner's reframing of feelings from inevitable and
justified ("Well, doc, wouldn't you feel the same way?")
to lies about their own nature and coverings for selfbetrayals accomplishes the requirements for the
definition above. He has certainly proposed a set of
concepts which also fit the situation, and by doing so has
changed the meaning of the situation for the person
being reframed.
My fear about these techniques is that counselors will
read or hear about them and proceed to try them out on
their clients. What Warner and his group can do, others
may not be able to do. Certainly much harm has come
from therapists trying to be Milton Erickson when they
are not. A similar problem can arise from Warner's
work. For example, it would be easy to try to reframe a
clinical depression with Warner's techniques, and I
predict the results could be disastrous. The depressive
person is clever at twisting things into statements of
self-blame, and could reply that now he feels guilty
about feeling depressed. Where may these techniques be
applied safely?
Herein lies the major problem with Warner's
presentation. While his stories are inspiring and
enlivening, they fail to provide scientific proof of
efficacy. In a field like psychotherapy, where everything
from Reality Therapy to Primal Scream can legitimately
be practiced by professionals, a basic problem is to find
out what works. My professional experience makes me
leary of people who want to impose any value system on
others, even the true one--not because the values are
not true, but because of the me/hods usually used to
impose them. Few counselors, in my experience, have
the integrity needed to impose values successfully, and
tend to use guilt and pressure in place of love. A
therapist with a good system of values (espoused) and a
poor method of actualizing them in the lives of clients
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these issues. My intention has been to challenge and
propose, not to attack, and I hope this dialogue may
continue.

the model of character defenses. She then shifted to a
strategic model of family therapy, in which she utilized
the idea that all anorexic behavior was really an attempt
to help the family. Oppositional, self-destructive
behavior was defined in the family therapy sessions as
not only helpful, but positively necessary for the family
to survive as a unit. This technique of positive canna/a/ion is
used to change feelings in the family in an indirect,
paradoxical way. In fact, the technique might be termed
a restraint from change technique, since the positive
connotation suggests the family cannot get along
without the problem.
Now if such parad.oxical and strategic methods work
powerfully in family therapy, and with difficult
problems without using interventions based on moral
choice or renunciation of defenses, why are the latter
methods necessary? I believe such methods most often
simply produce resistance and resentment in many
clients. We end up asking our clients to learn our
language. Erickson, in contrast, always instructed his
students to speak the language of the patient. With Joe,
the florist suffering unbearable pain from terminal
cancer, Erickson never mentioned pain relief or
relaxation or acceptance. Instead he spoke to Joe about
the growth of plants, tomato plants, and the comfort and
satisfaction a tomato plant might feel in growth, in rest,
in the cycles of living. Joe achieved the results of pain
relief, acceptance, and the giving up of his bitterness and
fear without having to learn any new concepts or
language. Erickson instead learned Joe's language, and
used it to help Joe very economically.
Warner's program involves people learning new
language and concepts. Again, this may not be necessary
from a pragmatic perspective. Warner is locked into this
position, however, by his assumption that mental and
spiritual health are the same, and that mental suffering
is caused by spiritual factors. That may be. It is also likely
that mental suffering is caused by a variety of other
factors, including inadequate utilization of personal
resources, genetic factors, physical diseases, the
interaction of physical and mental processes, and so on.
If we can cure many of the patients we see without
attending to supposed spiritual causes, have we
performed a valuable function? Or could it be we are
merely making well-adjusted sinners? In that case we
are doing great harm.
But let us pursue this farther. If we admit that we have
cured a person and made a well-adjusted sinner, we are
admitting that sin and suffering are independent. Once
we admit that, we must also admit that this notion that
feelings are sins must be rejected. If individuals, families,
and groups can be happy and well-adjusted without
accepting the sinful nature of bad feelings, then Warner
is in the uncomfortable position of Pope Urban, who
insisted Galileo recant his idea tha t the earth moved.
("Nevertherless," he muttered, "it does move.")
Scientific ideas must be tested against scientific criteria,
not religious ones.
Warner has performed a valuable service by
expressing these ideas. I enjoyed the article and am
grateful for the incentive it has given me to think about

Postscript: Just before this article was to be mailed to
the editor of this journal, Warner was kind enough to
send me a copy of his talk given to the BYU Alumni
College on January 24, 1979. (Warner, 1979) The
material in this talk answers some of the points I have
raised. For example, he has begun to do follow-up, and
estimates that 40% of those attending his seminars are
benefiting. He also suggests others may benefit slowly.
In this paper he also makes the point that many
psychotherapists do not consider their patients
responsible for what they feel and do. Again, I believe
from my experience with Beier and Erickson, that this
position does not fairly represent the strategic therapy
model. In psychotherapy supervision, I have heard Beier
respond to a husband who feels his wife is unfeeling,
"And what do you do to deserve an unfeeling wife?" The
principle of shifting responsibility back to the patient
underlies all of his work, although it is often more subtle
and at times understated than in Warner's work.
Perhaps the reason Warner hasn't been challenged on
his assertions about psychotherapy relieving the
individual of responsibility is that, sadly enough, so
much therapy is done precisely the way Warner
describes. Of the theories of psychotherapy now
around, aside from the strategic therapy model (more
precisely, models), I have the idea I would be most
comfortable with Warner's. Like strategic therapy, it
involves a genuine (second-order) change; that is, a
change in the way of being, and explicitly states that
class of change as a purpose. I continue to assert that the
strategic model is more parsimonious, and hope, again,
this dialogue my continue.
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